

VZCZCXRO7671
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2442/01 2952119
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 222119Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6991
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOG/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 9391
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 7036
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0854
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 4298
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7548
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1512
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8170
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7698

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 TOKYO 002442

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [OIIP](#) [KMDR](#) [KPAO](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [ECON](#) [ELAB](#) [JA](#)

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/22/09

INDEX:

- (1) Tension spikes in Japan-U.S. alliance with Obama administration shifting to tough stance on Futenma, Afghan aid, secret nuclear agreement (Yomiuri)
- (2) Editorial: Governor's response on Futenma relocation: Steep price to pay for ambiguity (Okinawa Times)
- (3) Editorial: "Friction over security issues" could put Japan-U.S. alliance at risk (Nikkei)
- (4) Prime Minister Ohira considered unveiling secret nuclear pact in 1980 (Asahi)
- (5) American academic urges Hatoyama administration to have courage to revise campaign pledges (Asahi)
- (6) Sankei-FNN poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Sankei)
- (7) Prime Minister's schedule, October 21 (Nikkei)

ARTICLES:

- (1) Tension spikes in Japan-U.S. alliance with Obama administration shifting to tough stance on Futenma, Afghan aid, secret nuclear agreement

YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full)
October 22, 2009

Tokyo -- Washington Bureau reporter Satoshi Ogawa

The visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Japan, where the main issue was how to handle the relocation of the U.S. Marines' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, ended in discord, with Gates strongly pressing Japan to reach a decision before President Barack Obama's visit to Japan on Nov. 12-13, and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and other Japanese officials not offering a definite response. At a news conference held after his meetings, Gates made repeated demands of the Hatoyama administration in an unusually strong tone, which is rare in diplomacy. Tension in the Japan-U.S. alliance has heightened ahead of the U.S. President's visit to Japan.

A senior Japanese government official was visibly shocked after watching Gates's news conference on Oct. 21. He said: "I'm surprised he made such blunt statements. It appears that without any consideration for diplomacy he simply explained the heated exchanges that took place during the meetings."

Gates said: "Without (the construction of) the replacement facility (in Nago City), there can be no relocation (of U.S. Marines in Okinawa) to Guam. There will also be no troop reductions or return of land in Okinawa." This amounted to "open intimidation" (in the words of a government source): if the Hatoyama administration does not make any progress on Futenma relocation, the transfer of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, a main feature of the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment plans, and other measures to reduce the burden imposed by military bases will not be implemented. Gates's tough stance reflects the fact that the Obama administration has

TOKYO 00002442 002 OF 012

judged its soft approach to the Hatoyama administration a "failure." One participant on the U.S. side in the meetings observed, "We have been too soft so far," admitting the shift to a hard-line approach toward Japan.

The tough stance is not limited to the Futenma issue. At his meetings and during the news conference, Gates demanded an increase in financial contributions to expand the Afghan armed forces and police as part of Afghan aid measures. He also made it a point to mention the secret agreement on bringing nuclear arms into Japan and cautioned that "this should not have a negative impact on the bilateral relationship."

According to a senior Ministry of Defense official, this time Gates declined a salute from a guard of honor, something normally performed by the Self-Defense Forces for welcoming state guests and other VIPs. Observers interpreted this as sign tough negotiations lay ahead in Tokyo.

The lack of consensus on the Japanese side was also pronounced. In response to Gates's demand to implement the USFJ realignment plans at an early date, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said, "We don't plan to spend too much time." Meanwhile, Hatoyama said, "We need a bit more time to give the issues careful consideration and to come up with an answer." The Prime Minister reiterated to reporters on the evening of Oct. 21 his policy to consider the government's response after the Nago mayoral election next January.

In a speech delivered to the Yomiuri International Economic Society meeting on Oct. 21, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada revealed that Gates had said in the meeting with him on Oct. 20 that "discussions have been going on for 13 years (since the Japan-US. agreement on the return of Futenma) and the arguments have been exhausted," and that he had responded, "As an opposition party we argued against the Japan-U.S. agreement during that period."

The fact that a coordination process had taken place among Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano, Okada, and Kitazawa ahead of Gates's visit also gave the impression that the government was not prepared with a diplomatic position before the Okada-Gates talks on Oct. 20.

(2) Editorial: Governor's response on Futenma relocation: Steep price to pay for ambiguity

The U.S. government is taking advantage of the Okinawa Prefectural Government's acceptance of the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air Station to corner the Hatoyama administration.

Governor Hirokazu Nakaima should admit that he has been co-opted into such a scheme.

The governor's oft-repeated phrase that "relocation out of the prefecture is the best option" sounds like a meaningless cliché. If he maintains an ambiguous attitude at this critical stage in the fate of the base issue, his words might be used in an unintended way. Recent developments concerning the Futenma issue have substantiated this contention.

TOKYO 00002442 003 OF 012

Shortly before U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's visit to Japan, a senior Department of Defense official stated that moving the planned Futenma replacement facility in Henoko, Nago City, farther offshore by 50 meters would be acceptable. The official said: "If the governor wants to move the facility, that is an issue between the Japanese government and the governor. If a proposal is made, we will consider it."

The timing of this shift in the policy of the U.S. government, which had insisted the replacement facility could not be moved even 1 millimeter, can be interpreted as a mere maneuver for the purpose of finding a meeting point.

Secretary Gates also conveyed to the Japanese government the U.S.'s readiness to accept moving the replacement facility farther offshore. This is a major concession on the part of the U.S. government, which had pushed for construction of the facility in the coastal area of Camp Schwab.

Because the governor said this would be a "good thing," he has finally come out with a clear stance. It would appear that the governor and the U.S. government are working hand-in-hand to check the Hatoyama administration's moves toward reexamining the agreement on returning Futenma, including the possibility of relocating it out of Okinawa or out of Japan.

We wonder if the governor is aware of the popular will. An opinion poll conducted by Okinawa Times and Asahi Shimbun in May disclosed that 68 percent of Okinawans oppose and only 18 percent favor Futenma's relocation within the prefecture. There is a chasm between the Nakaima administration and the popular will.

This debate is distorted.

Allowing foreign troops to use Japan's national territory is an issue that touches on sovereignty. Normally, the host country provides the facilities and training grounds to meet the requirements of the troops whose deployment it recognizes as necessary. Why is the U.S. defense secretary making the determination that relocation to the coastal area of Camp Schwab is the only option and telling Japan that plans to relocate the Marines to Guam will be scrapped without Futenma relocation, as if he were serving an ultimatum?

This also sounds like intimidation.

His statement resembles a warning to a new administration aiming at an "equal relationship."

The Futenma base is a U.S. Marine facility. The government needs to explain to the people whether the Marines are indispensable for Japan's defense and security. Furthermore, unless it clarifies why the Marines cannot function if they are not based in Okinawa, debate is untenable.

The present situation where senior U.S. officials' statements appear

to decide Japan's policy is too unprincipled. Okinawa has been tossed into just such a situation.

The governor should express Okinawa's indignation in a straightforward manner.

TOKYO 00002442 004 OF 012

The option of relocation out of Okinawa is often nixed because nowhere else will accept a new military base. This is an utterly unreasonable notion. Are other prefectures saying that it is all right for Okinawa to host the base when they themselves refuse to do so?

If the Japan-U.S. security alliance is indeed important, the concomitant burden should be borne in mind. Japan is often criticized for enjoying a "free ride" in security, but the reality is that the free ride is made on the back of Okinawa.

Now is the time for Governor Nakaima to question with vehemence the postwar security policy of concentrating military bases in Okinawa.

(3) Editorial: "Friction over security issues" could put Japan-U.S. alliance at risk

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
October 22, 2009

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates might be wondering why he flew across the Pacific. While in Japan, he met with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. But none of them talked about what he wanted to hear - specific support measures to replace the Maritime Self-Defense Force's ongoing refueling mission and words of commitment to the Japan-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa.

Imagine if the U.S. remained noncommittal even though the Japanese defense minister visited the U.S. immediately after a new government had been launched there and wanted to reconfirm an accord concluded between Japan and the previous U.S. administration. The defense minister must be wondering why he visited the U.S.

A new administration will naturally bring about changes in policy, but international promises and policies are different matters. For instance, the previous Bush administration took over the accord its predecessor Clinton administration concluded with Japan in 1996 on the return of U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. If the U.S. had overturned the accord, Tokyo would have become distrustful of Washington's foreign policy.

In countries in which regimes changes occur frequently, it is customary to place emphasis on the continuity of foreign policy. Japan is now in the stage of trial and error.

It was revealed through Defense Secretary Gates's visit to Japan that there is friction between Japan and the U.S. over security issues. The friction must be quickly resolved so that it is only a temporary phenomenon. If the two countries remain unable to take care of their pending issues, President Barack Obama's planned visit to Japan in November might end in failure even if the two countries try to gloss over the failure with words, as they did in the case of Gates's Japan visit.

If the discord over security issues lasts for a long time, Japan-U.S. ties will inevitably weaken.

The Obama administration might begin to regard China as a more trustworthy partner than its ally, Japan. In negotiations on issues related to North Korea, as well, China might become more influential

TOKYO 00002442 005 OF 012

and Japan might eventually feel even more frustrated. Also in negotiations on pending issues between Japan and China, including

the development of gas fields, if Japan loses the support of the U.S., its position will become weaker.

If the Hatoyama administration feels that it was able to display "an equal Japan-U.S. relationship," this should be considered dangerous self-contentment.

In discussing the Futenma issue with Gates, Okada pointed out the current difficult political situation in Japan and sought his understanding about the government's stance. This remark, made by a senior ruling party official after its recent landslide victory in the general election, could be interpreted as an excuse for a lack of coordination and leadership capability.

The Hatoyama administration has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security policies. If this is not simply diplomatic language, the administration should make the decision to continue the refueling mission and take action to implement the relocation plan for the Futenma facility as soon as possible; otherwise, the Japan-U.S. alliance may turn into a mere name and may not properly function in an emergency situation.

The prime minister, the foreign minister and the defense minister are lacking in a sense of crisis. This could result in exposing the Japan-U.S. alliance to risk.

(4) Prime Minister Ohira considered unveiling secret nuclear pact in 1980

ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly)
October 22, 2009

Masahiro Tsuruoka

In the spring of 1980, shortly before his sudden death, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira considered disclosing to the public port calls in Japan by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons and dissolving a secret nuclear pact between Japan and the United States. This was revealed in Asahi Shimbun interviews with Hajime Morita, a former House of Representatives member, and Lower House lawmaker Koichi Kato. Morita was serving as secretary to Prime Minister Ohira and Kato as deputy chief cabinet secret at the time.

In 1963, Foreign Minister Ohira held talks with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer and confirmed the pact's interpretation that Tokyo was to allow port calls in Japan by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons. This was revealed through testimonies and documents in the United States. The Asahi Shimbun interviews have made clear that Ohira was concerned about the fact that the pact was still kept under cover (in 1980) when he was serving as prime minister and that he considered dissolving the agreement.

According to Morita, about two months before his death, Prime Minister Ohira called into his office Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi Ito, Kato, and himself. There, Ohira asked for their opinions, saying, "Don't you think it's about time to let the people know about port calls by vessels carrying nuclear weapons?" Kato also remembers this scene. "I don't think that would be appropriate at this point," Ito replied. Morita followed suit, saying, "That's

TOKYO 00002442 006 OF 012

not possible." Kato echoed Morita's opinion.

According to Morita, Ohira then said, "I know it's difficult. That's why I am asking for your opinions," and he did not bring up the issue again before he died. Ohira did not seem surprised at the U.S. view immediately after his meeting with Ambassador Reischauer. But he gradually began to think seriously about the gap between the government's official position and reality, and developed a desire to unveil the secret pact. On several occasions Morita heard Ohira mumbling "introduction, introduction" (referring to the introduction of nuclear weapons) in the car on the road.

Many years after retiring as ambassador to Japan, Reischauer testified in 1981 that Ohira in their meeting in 1963 had confirmed

the U.S. view that port calls were not equivalent to the introduction (of nuclear weapons). But the Japanese government has consistently denied this fact.

Shortly after assuming office, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada ordered the ministry to investigate four secret agreements, including one on the introduction of nuclear weapons, and to produce a report by the end of November. A third-party panel to be set up will also interview persons familiar with the matter.

After entering the Finance Ministry, Morita married the eldest daughter of Ohira, a former Finance Ministry official. In 1962, Morita became a secretary to Foreign Minister Ohira. In 1972, Morita again served as secretary to Ohira, who became foreign minister for a second time.

Seinan Jogakuin University Professor Hideki Kan, who found copies of official U.S. telegrams on the Ohira-Reischauer talks about 10 years ago, said: "It is significant that there was a politician who agonized over deceiving the people about the existence of a secret (nuclear) pact and considered disclosing the pact to the public."

(5) American academic urges Hatoyama administration to have courage to revise campaign pledges

ASAHI (Page 15) (Full)
October 22, 2009

Gerald Curtis, professor at Columbia University

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the administration just over a month ago, but its achievements during this short period are impressive. First of all, the government has changed its policymaking systems drastically, and not just in the sense that the methods of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) era have been changed. The system of an administration comprising the senior bureaucrats appointed by the Emperor and the majority party in the Diet was established during the Taisho period, and this has remained basically unchanged even under the new postwar constitution. The historical significance of the Hatoyama administration's revolutionary change of this system of governance is tremendous.

The new system under which the cabinet makes policies and the party passes these policies in the Diet prevents the zoku giin (Diet members lobbying for special interests) from coming into play and clarifies accountability for policymaking. The phenomenon of cabinet ministers talking to the people in their own words, and not reading from scripts prepared by the bureaucrats, is a symbol of the major

TOKYO 00002442 007 OF 012

changes brought about by the Hatoyama administration.

I have long had doubts about the myth that the bureaucrats are to blame (for Japan's problems). There is nothing wrong with the bureaucracy itself. The issue is whether the politicians controlling the administration are able to fully utilize their governing abilities, and not leave things in the hands of the bureaucrats, and are able to make the capable bureaucrats or bureaucrats who have a sense of mission to make contributions to the country to work closely with the cabinet.

In any case, the people have high hopes for and give strong support to the Hatoyama administration's efforts so far. The United States and other countries are closely watching developments from now on.

However, the Hatoyama administration also faces serious problems. The first problem is how to maintain the unity of the cabinet, since the DPJ has formed a coalition with small parties because it does not control a majority in the House of Councillors.

The notion during the LDP era that each minister is the boss in his ministry is incompatible with the DPJ administration's thinking. If Mr. Hatoyama allows the leader of junior coalition partner People's New Party to openly declare that the prime minister cannot possibly fire him and behave like he is an equal of the prime minister, this will undermine not only the prime minister's authority, but also the

unity of the cabinet.

Another issue is whether the administration is able to display courage in revising the policies included in the DPJ's campaign manifesto if warranted. Campaign pledges are just campaign pledges. A responsible political leader should not be obsessed with policies just because they are campaign pledges, regardless of whether funding is available.

With tax revenues plunging, the issuance of more deficit-funding bonds will be required if all the policies in the manifesto are to be implemented. Child allowances, toll-free expressways, and so forth are not one-time policies. Since they will probably continue for many years, spending for these policies will increase every year. If government debts increase any further, the credibility of the Hatoyama administration will be jeopardized.

Flexibility to make revisions if warranted is necessary, even for campaign pledges. Like U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama won the election under the slogan of "change." After taking office, President Obama has made pragmatic revisions to specific policies while standing firm on his basic ideals. If the Hatoyama administration can convince the people on this point and demonstrate its courage and resolve, it will probably become the administration that will realize the historical changes Japan needs.

(6) Sankei-FNN poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties

SANKEI (Page 5) (Full)
October 20, 2009

Questions & Answers

(Note) Figures are percentages. Figures in parentheses are percentages in the previous Sankei-FNN survey, conducted Sept.

TOKYO 00002442 008 OF 012

16-17.

Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet?

Yes 60.9 (68.7)
No 20.7 (15.3)
Don't know (D/K), etc. 18.4 (16.0)

Q: Which political party do you support?

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 40.6 (44.4)
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 18.9 (18.8)
New Komeito (NK or Komeito) 3.6 (4.0)
Japanese Communist Party (JCP or Kyosanto) 2.7 (2.7)
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.3 (2.4)
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 2.3 (4.1)
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.5 (0.3)
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.0 (0.3)
Other political parties 0.5 (0.8)
None 28.5 (21.6)
D/K, etc. 1.1 (0.6)

Q: Do you have high expectations for the Hatoyama government on the following points?

The prime minister's personal character
Yes 71.0
No 15.6
D/K, etc. 13.4

The prime minister's leadership
Yes 41.5
No 28.5
D/K, etc. 30.0

Foreign, security policies
Yes 42.1
No 24.9

D/K, etc. 33.0

Economic policy

Yes 36.2

No 34.6

D/K, etc. 29.2

Cutting government waste

Yes 72.2

No 15.6

D/K, etc. 12.2

Relations with bureaucrats

Yes 76.1

No 10.4

D/K, etc. 13.5

Budget

Yes 47.0

No 29.9

D/K, etc. 23.1

Teamwork

Yes 46.8

TOKYO 00002442 009 OF 012

No 29.7

D/K, etc. 23.5

Performance at 1 month

Yes 52.7

No 21.4

D/K, etc. 25.9

Q: What do you think about the Hatoyama government on the following points?

Mr. Ichiro Ozawa is the right person as DPJ secretary general

Yes 49.0 (56.7)

No 39.0 (33.3)

D/K, etc. 12.0 (10.0)

Mr. Katsuya Okada is the right person as foreign minister

Yes 70.1 (63.7)

No 15.2 (18.0)

D/K, etc. 14.7 (18.3)

Mr. Akira Nagatsuma is the right person as health, labor and welfare minister

Yes 66.3 (70.0)

No 17.2 (9.3)

D/K, etc. 16.5 (20.7)

Mr. Seiji Maehara is the right person as land, infrastructure and transport minister

Yes 62.5 (-----)

No 23.4 (-----)

D/K, etc. 14.1 (-----)

Mr. Shizuka Kamei is the right person as state minister for postal reform

Yes 24.9 (41.8)

No 53.9 (40.2)

D/K, etc. 21.2 (18.0)

Ms. Mizuho Fukushima is the right person as state minister for consumer affairs and declining birthrate

Yes 46.8 (61.5)

No 29.7 (24.3)

D/K, etc. 23.5 (14.2)

The DPJ's coalition with the SDP and the PNP is good

Yes 52.7 (49.8)

No 21.4 (37.1)

D/K, etc. 25.9 (13.1)

You feel Mr. Ozawa's influence in the cabinet lineup

Yes 49.0 (61.3)

No 39.0 (26.8)

D/K, etc. 12.0 (11.9)

Do you think the Diet should discuss such issues as the "child allowance handout" plan during its extraordinary session?

Yes 70.1 (-----)

No 15.2 (-----)

D/K, etc. 14.7 (-----)

TOKYO 00002442 010 OF 012

You have high expectations for the DPJ's newly elected lawmakers?

Yes 66.3 (39.2)

No 17.2 (43.8)

D/K, etc. 16.5 (17.0)

Q: Do you have high expectations for LDP President Sadakazu Tanigaki?

Yes 34.1

No 54.7

D/K, etc. 11.2

Q: Do you think the DPJ should keep its manifesto without fail?

The DPJ should do so 9.0

The DPJ should do its best to do so, but it can't be helped if it fails to keep some pledges in its manifesto 38.8

The DPJ should flexibly translate its policies into action without being bound to its pledges 50.6

D/K, etc. 1.6

Q: Do you think the DPJ should translate the following policies into action?

No fees for high school

Yes 46.9

No 44.1

D/K, etc. 9.0

Abolition of provisional gasoline tax rates

Yes 57.1

No 29.3

D/K, etc. 13.6

Compensation for farming households

Yes 59.2

No 21.7

D/K, etc. 19.1

Loan moratorium for small businesses

Yes 54.9

No 28.4

D/K, etc. 16.7

Relocation of the U.S. military's Futenma airfield outside Okinawa Prefecture

Yes 45.1

No 29.1

D/K, etc. 25.8

Ban on bureaucrats' replies before the Diet

Yes 39.9

No 35.7

D/K, etc. 24.4

25 PERCENT cuts in Japan's greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels as a midterm goal

Yes 72.7

No 17.5

D/K, etc. 9.8

Q: Who do you think is appropriate as prime minister among the

following politicians?

Yukio Hatoyama 28.7
Katsuya Okada 8.2
Naoto Kan 5.5
Ichiro Ozawa 4.4
Seiji Maehara 3.9
Akira Nagatsuma 1.6
Other ruling party lawmakers 1.7
Yoichi Masuzoe 9.7
Shigeru Ishiba 4.2
Nobuteru Ishihara 2.5
Sadakazu Tanigaki 2.2
Taro Kono 0.8
Yasutoshi Nishimura 0.1
Other opposition lawmakers 3.4
None 16.5
D/K, etc. 6.6

Q: Would you like the ruling or opposition parties to win next year's election for the House of Councillors?

The DPJ and other new ruling parties 59.0 (58.6)
The LDP and other new opposition parties 32.9 (32.3)
D/K, etc. 8.1 (9.1)

Q: How long do you think the Hatoyama government will continue?

About several months 4.0 (1.3)
Until around next summer's election for the House of Councillors 16.8 (18.2)
Until next fall 26.5 (24.1)
Until after next fall 47.7 (51.9)
D/K, etc. 5.0 (4.5)

Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Oct. 17-18 by the Sankei Shimbun and Fuji News Network (FNN) over the telephone on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. For the survey, a total of 1,000 persons were sampled from among men and women, aged 20 and over, across the nation.

(7) Prime Minister's schedule, October 21

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
October 22, 2009

08:42 Met Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano at the Prime Minister's Official Residence.
09:10 Met U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, followed by former Prime Minister Mori, with Hirano present.
10:11 Met Environment Minister Ozawa. Later attended a meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies.
12:17 Met Katsura Sanshi, a professional comic storyteller, with Transport Minister Maehara and others present.
14:17 Met Cabinet Intelligence Director Mitani.
15:10 Responded to an interview with the Thai newspaper Bangkok Post. Later, met State Minister for Administrative Reform Council Sengoku, Cabinet Office Vice Minister Furukawa, and Government Revitalization Unit Executive Secretary Kato.
16:22 Met Deputy Foreign Minister Sasae, Deputy Education Minister Shimizu, Director General for International Affairs Saneshige of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry, and others.

17:32 Met Chinese National Peoples Representatives Congress Foreign Affairs Committee chief Li, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and others.
18:45 Met at the prime minister's official residential quarters with Diet Affairs Committee Deputy Chairman Mitsui, the head directors of Lower House standing committees, and others.
20:29 Met Health, Labor and Welfare Minister Nagatsuma and parliamentary secretary Yamanoi.

21:39 Returned to his home.

ROOS